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Abstract 
 
The right to adequate housing, including prohibition on forced eviction, has increasingly been the 
subject of judicial and quasi-judicial review at both the international and national levels. The 
emerging body of jurisprudence on housing rights along with issues of forced evictions 
underscores that they are indeed legally justiciable human rights. Judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies should thus not shy away from dealing with cases involving such matters. Mandated to 
promote and protect human rights, the Human Rights Commission of Ethiopia was set up in 2000 
as part of democratic institutions stipulated under the FDRE Constitution. Since its inception, the 
Commission has been receiving a growing number of complaints every year. Among them, a 
considerable number of complaints involve issues of housing rights and forced evictions. In most 
instances, it has rejected such complaints. Investigation of complaints on forced eviction is an 
exception rather than the norm. Although the reasons for the rejection of the bulk of complaints 
are varied, the Commission seems to avoid politically sensitive issues, such as the ones relating to 
forced eviction. This negates the very underpinning of the Commission. The Commission was set 
up as a reaction to the human rights abuses of the past and is meant to ensure that human rights 
and freedoms are the centre of all development initiatives. This paper, after presenting 
background information on the Commission and the normative framework of forced evictions, 
examines the handling by the Commission of complaints relating forced evictions carried out in 
rural and urban areas. It reviews some of the typical complaints rejected by the Commission to 
explore the rationale for the Commission’s action. Finally, it recommends measures to be adopted 
to help the Commission deal with human rights complaints involving government policies and 
action.  
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Introduction 
 
In addition to the past endeavour to meet the MDGs, the Ethiopian government launched an 
ambitious program, ‘Growth and Transformative Plan (2011-2015)’ in 2011 to transform the 
country’s economic growth and development. As a core part of the Plan, the economic and 
infrastructure sections envisage massive investment and infrastructure development. While the 
ultimate target is to improve socio-economic conditions and fulfil basis needs, the Plan will likely 
heighten massive eviction of people from their ancestral lands and thousands from their houses, 
and deprive many more of the traditional means of livelihood. Both the past and present 
development endeavours gave little attention to a human rights-approach to development. The 
discourse on economic growth and development tends to focus more on mere economic 
improvement, implying a needs-based approach. This will reinforce the notion that the fulfilment 
of economic, social and cultural rights is an aspiration realized by the government program, with 
no obligation on the part of the government. 
 
One of the core functions of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) is to investigate 
complaints. The Human Rights Commission of Ethiopia (Commission) has been receiving 
complaints on a wide range of issues since it started rendering its quasi-judicial functions, 
including many complaints relating to forced evictions. The Commission has rejected the bulk of 
the complaints or referred them to either courts of law or/and the Ombudsman Institute on the 
ground that they do not involve human rights issues (i.e. they are mere administrative matters that 
do not qualify for its inquiry). By the same token, investigation of complaints on forced eviction 
is an exception rather than the norm. Disclaiming jurisdiction might shed light on the underlining 
issues-it might mark fear on the part of the Commission not to confront the economic and 
development policies of the government; or the adoption of a pre-conceived approach to issues of 
economic, social and cultural rights, or an erroneous interpretation of its mandate or incapacity to 
deal with such issues. This paper will deal with the Commission’s handling of complaints 
pertaining to the right to housing in general and forced eviction in particular. Some of the 
interesting complaints handled by the Commission will be reviewed to see the underlining 
reasons hampering the Commission from examining the essence of specific cases. Some 
measures to be adopted so that the Commission could probe complaints of all sorts in general and 
of forced evictions in particular are hinted at. 
The source of information for the study is the records of the Commission, legal instruments, both 
national and international, and literature. 
 
1. Political Context of and Process in Setting up the Commission  
 
NHRIs are usually set up following constitutional reform and/or chaotic situations ending with a 
peace accord
1
. Regarding mode of setting up, they can be established in three ways: by 
constitution (or amendment of constitution), by act of parliament, and by presidential decree
2
. 
The setting up of NHRIs stipulated in a constitutional text, which represents the most powerful 
option as it guarantees the permanence of the institutions, is found in countries that have recently 
undergone constitutional reforms and that were marked by grave human rights violations in the 
past
3
.   
 
Coming to Ethiopia, the evolution of the discourse on democracy, human rights, and democratic 
institutions in the country took place at a time of significant legal and political change. The 
current ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) staged a 
successful armed struggle against the former military regime, ousting it from power in 1991. 
Issues of democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, and decentralization emerged as 
central ones after the demise of the military regime
4
. The then transitional government undertook 
major transformative measures overhauling the political landscape and orientation, civil service, 
and economic policy of the nation aimed at redressing past injustices, atrocities and dire 
economic conditions amid high public expectations to usher in a new era
5
.    
 
Faced with the lofty task of creating a foundation for a democratic system, those involved in 
crafting a new constitution looked to providing (intended to provide?) a rights-based constitution 
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anchored in the rule of law and limited government. A set of provisions with human rights 
orientation was believed to play a central role in this regard. This explicates the due regard the 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution) bestows to 
fundamental rights and freedoms
6
. 
Appreciating that the existing courts (or other institutions, such as the House of Federation) 
cannot alone shoulder the protection of human rights, the framers of the Constitution agreed on 
the need for democratic institutions that would advance democratic governance
7
.  The 
Commission was thus created as one of the rights-protective mechanisms as a response to a 
history of authoritarian rule in general and a notorious military dictatorship in particular that 
caused immense carnage
8
. Its root in the Constitution lends it public legitimacy as the 
Constitution was drafted and adopted following wider public participation. While a constitutional 
foundation does not ipso facto guarantee its better functioning, it provides a more secure basis 
than an executive decree or order, which is prone to change easily. 
 
It was largely domestic impulse that sparked off the need for democratic institutions during the 
transition period. Increased international factors also opened room for conditions favouring 
human rights regime in general and democratic institutions in particular in the new democratic 
process set in motion in the same period. Arguably, the global upsurge in the number of NHRIs, 
dating back to the early 1990s, has thus affected Ethiopia as well
9
. Because issues of human 
rights entered Ethiopian political vocabulary in part through external influences at the time of 
transition
10
.  It suffices to mention the policy impact of the USA, which emerged as a major 
supporter and donor of the incumbent party following the collapse of the former regime.  In mid 
1991, the Bush (Sr.) Administration adopted a new policy toward Africa, which judged 
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governments by their stability and effective governance in order to secure U.S.A.'s economic 
assistance
11
. This American policy, which centred on democracy and human rights, found one of 
its first applications in Ethiopia
12
.  
 
Compared to other legislation, the process of enacting the enabling statute of the Commission and 
the Ombudsman Institute is unprecedented, considering a wide range of public and expert 
participation amid heightened public expectation
13
. Specifically, it involved an input of 
international experts and practitioners of NHRIs, public discussion throughout the country on 
draft legislation and workshop of local experts on it
14
.  Drawing on this, Parliament eventually 
enacted the enabling legislation of the Commission, Proclamation No. 210/2000, in 2000. 
However, the nomination of the Chief Commissioner took place only in July 2004 and of the 
other two Commissioners a year later. The delay in the enactment of the legislation and 
appointment of officials was attributed to the Ethio-Eritrean War (1998-2000) that diverted the 
attention of the government to issues of maintaining national security
15
. On top of the war, the 
process was stalled by political and bureaucratic procedures
16
. 
 
Although the Commission’s enabling legislation involved (was based on) a broad-based 
consultation of the general public and experts, both local and international human rights NGOs 
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were excluded from the consultation, triggering criticism
17
. Despite this, the setting up of the 
Commission can be regarded as willingness on the part of the government to change the complex 
human rights situation in the country
18
. 
 
Because an apparent lack of appropriate social and political action and determination to condemn 
and sanction social norms abusive of human rights have been of concern in the country for a long 
time
19
.  
 
Upon its establishment, there was high expectation of what the Commission would offer. This is 
unsurprising in a nation where the immense violation of dignity of citizens at the hands of the 
brutal military junta was still fresh in the memory of millions of people.  
 
2. Structure and Composition of the Commission 
 
Both a statutory and constitutional body, the Commission is an independent autonomous 
institution accountable to Parliament (the House of People’s Representatives). Compared to 
NHRIs elsewhere, it is a relatively small Commission, composed of a Chief Commissioner, a 
Deputy Chief Commissioner and a Commissioner for Children and Women, and other 
commissioners as may be deemed necessary, and the necessary personnel
20
. Given the large 
number of ethno-linguistic groups in the country, coupled with limited posts for officials, one 
may not obviously expect the Commission to replicate such diversity at a time.  
 
Increasing its outreach, the Commission, in 2011, set up branch offices in different parts of the 
country, with most of them in the Capital cities of different States
21
. Apart from advancing the 
promotion and protection of human rights at the local level, the decentralization has enhanced the 
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Commission’s staff diversity and pluralism as local staff and local vernaculars are used to 
conduct their respective activities
22
. While regional offices mean better access, physical access 
remains a barrier for much of the rural population.  
 
The Proclamation provides a number of rules guaranteeing the institutional independence of the 
Commission in terms of allocation of funding, and appointment and dismissal of and immunity to 
its officials
23
. Other guarantees of independence in the form of its authority to recruit, and employ 
staff and to adopt working rules and procedures are provided under the legislation
24
.  
 
Generally, the Proclamation meets, at least theoretically, the requirement of the Paris Principles 
regarding the independence of NHRIs. The issue is however whether the officials appointed to 
run the institution are, in practice, truly independent of party politics and the executive while 
discharging their functions. This is significant given the fact that the country did not, to a large 
extent, have institutions that were and are capable of functioning independently of the 
government of the day
25
. That apparently is why scepticism was raised, at the very inception of 
the Commission, as regards the independence of the first officials that assumed office
26
.  
 
Taking the existing procedure and practice as backdrop, the appointment of party members or 
affiliates is inevitable in a country where the government of the day controls all the institutions. 
Especially, the appointment of the Chief Commissioner, who usually leads the Commission, may 
ultimately depend on the will of the political party in power
27
. 
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28
.  Its second application was scheduled for scrutiny by ICC in November 2012 
but has been deferred for one year, after which it was accredited with “B” status29. 
 
3. Mandate and Power of the Commission 
 
As provided under Article 6 of the Proclamation, the Commission has a very broad mandate to 
promote and protect human rights
30
.  
                                                                                                                                                              
identified as party member, the Chief Commissioner, Tiruneh Zena, is thought to be affiliated to the ruling party. 
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31
. The fact that the 
Ombudsman’s mandate is confined to maladministration issues only, making it a prototype of a 
classical ombudsman, signifies the inclusiveness of the Commission’s mandate on human rights 
issues
32
.  
 
Such inclusive mandate is advantageous. On top of considering scarcity of resources, it allows for 
the application of an integrated and consistent human rights approach to different human rights 
issues. In other words, it is more cost-effective than dispersing the fiscal resources across several 
new human rights bodies, especially for a poor country like Ethiopia. 
 
The Commission’s reach is not without limitation however. It does not have the power to 
scrutinize alleged human rights violations pending before the House of People’ Representatives, 
the House of Federation, or courts of law at any level
33
. It is remarkable that the statute subjected 
the military, security, and police forces that are closely associated with human rights abuses in 
the past to its power
34
. 
 
 
4. Investigation and Enforcement Power 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
propose revision, enactment of laws and formulation of policies relating to human rights (Article 6(4 and 5). In 
addition, it is empowered to ensure that laws, decisions and practices of the government are in harmony with human 
rights enshrined under the Constitution and to also make sure that human rights are respected by government as well 
as other entities(Article 6( 1 and 2). 
31
 Article 6(11) of the Proclamation 
32
 It is implicit from Article 6 of the enabling legislation of the Ombudsman Institute that it is a classical 
Ombudsman. See The Ombudsman Institute Establishment Proclamation No. 211/2000. 
33
 Article 7 of the Proclamation 
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 Abdo, supra note 4, op. cit., p. 37. The Commission is different from the Ombudsman in that the latter does not 
have the power to investigate matters related to national security and defence forces. See Article 7 of the 
Proclamation that set up the Ombudsman Institute, Proclamation No. 211/2000. However, in reporting on matters 
related to national security, the Commission is obliged to take caution with a view to not endangering national 
security and the same applies to secret matters related to the well-being or to protecting individual lives (Article 
39(3). 
The Commission is empowered to investigate complaints, upon individual complaints or suo 
moto
35
. The rules on filing a complaint to the Commission make it easy for complainants to 
access it as the Commission can be moved to take action by a complainant in person or by 
someone on his/her behalf in any language and format
36
.  
 
The Commission is given a range of powers to investigate a complaint submitted to it, including 
the investigative power of subpoena, giving it theoretically adequate powers necessary for the 
examination of a complaint
37
. Any person asked to appear for the purpose of furnishing 
information or production of document or record should cooperate with the Commission. Failure 
to do so is punishable by sentence and/or fine
38
.  
 
The Commission, as a matter of general rule, is supposed to settle complaints through amicable 
means, seeking an agreement between the parties (Article 26(1).  Emphasis on amicable means of 
settlement reflects the reality regarding dispute resolution in the country. The fact that more than 
84% of the population lives in rural areas where the traditional system has a strong authority on 
individual as well as communal matters makes the reflection of such system in the Commission’s 
power significant. 
 
Made in an advisor capacity, the Commission’s recommendations are not legally binding. It is 
not explicitly authorized to initiate court proceedings either in its own name or on behalf of an 
aggrieved party either
39
. However, it is under obligation to notify the concerned organs of the 
crimes or administrative faults committed, if it believes that such occurred in due course of or 
after its investigation
40
.  
 
The enforcement mechanisms it uses to ensure compliance are to publicize, be it in annual or 
special report as may be necessary, and to finally report to the parliament on its recommendations 
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 Ibid 
40
 Article 28 of the Proclamation 
in particular and on its overall activities in general
41
. Another instrument of enforcement is a 
criminal sanction
42
. Serving to strengthen its enforcement powers, such sanction is an incentive to 
the Commission’s autonomy. In addition, it may collaborate with other organs, for instance, 
media and NGOs, to mount pressure on government authorities to heed its opinions. 
 
The Commission possesses only persuasive powers to issue recommendation or initiate 
negotiation or mediation in order to resolve grievances. While this may, at first glance, appear to 
relegate the Commission to a back-seat role in promoting and protecting human rights abuses, it 
might bring with it freedom of movement and action in investigation of complaints and 
promotion of human rights.  
 
5. NHRIs and Forced Evictions 
 
Before reviewing the practice of the Commission in handling forced evictions, it is good to make 
a few quick remarks on forced evictions under international human rights law. 
 
As far as international human rights instruments are concerned, the most important document for 
discussing issues related to the right to adequate housing and forced evictions is the ICESCR (in 
full). The right to adequate standard of living, including adequate housing, serves as affirmative 
provision of the ICESCR prohibiting the violation of this right in the case of forced evictions
43
. 
 
Forced evictions can be broadly defined as the permanent or temporary removal against their will 
of individuals, families and/or communities from homes and/or land which they occupy or 
depend on, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other 
protection
44
. Forced evictions occur in both urban and rural areas, each with varying 
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justifications. Urban renewal, demolition of slums, preparation for mega-events (such as major 
sport events) and other ‘for public interest’ reasons are often used to justify forced eviction in 
urban areas
45
. In rural and remote areas, forced evictions could take place owing to, among 
others, large scale development projects (infrastructures, dams, and roads), mining, extractive and 
other industrial activities
46
. Forced eviction can also happen in connection with forced population 
transfers, internal displacement, and forced relocations in the context of armed conflict
47
. In all of 
these contexts, the right to adequate housing and not to be subjected to forced eviction may be 
violated through a wide range of acts or omissions attributable to state parties
48
. 
 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights clarified the normative and legal 
content of the right to adequate housing and forced evictions. One of the key aspects of the 
requirements of adequacy is legal security of tenure. In unequivocal terms, the Committee made 
it clear that all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal 
protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats
49
. It has argued that forced 
evictions are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the ICESCR
50
. Reinforcing this 
stance, the former UN Commission on Human Rights pronounced that the practice of forced 
evictions constitutes a gross violation of a broad range of human rights, in particular the right to 
adequate housing
51
. Not all evictions are prohibited under international human rights law, 
however. They can be justified in the most exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the 
relevant principles.  
 
Given the interdependence of all human rights, forced evictions frequently violate other human 
rights, including both civil and political rights
52
. The violations may occur when two conditions, 
one substantive and the other procedural, are met. They may occur because of the absence of 
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justification/legality for the eviction, and the way the eviction is carried out: i.e., the way the 
evictions are carried out is not compatible with the relevant human rights standards
53
.  
Forced evictions of individuals and communities from their homes and habitats destroy lives and 
livelihoods. While forced evictions adversely impact all segments of the society, groups of people 
that suffer disproportionately from the practice of forced evictions include women, children, 
youth, older persons, and indigenous people, ethnic and other minorities
54
. The Principles of non-
discrimination and substantive equality are of particular importance in ensuring that the rights of 
these vulnerable groups are protected. 
 
The practice of forced evictions can be countered through, among others, a strong political will of 
the national government to carefully implement development endeavors, a concerted action of 
human rights defenders, the use of international as well as national human rights norms, and the 
effective monitoring role of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.  
 
As entities empowered to enforce human rights and to ensure that laws, policies and practices of 
the government adhere to human rights standards, judicial and quasi judicial bodies are 
competent to deal with complaints arising from forced evictions. However, a preventive approach 
to forced evictions is more efficient than trying to resolve cases once the process commences. In 
other words, addressing the legal and structural problems that could prevent the recurrence of 
forced evictions in the first place is more important that handling individual complaints. 
Endowed with power to launch investigation by their own initiative and to conduct public 
inquiry, NHRIs are ideally best-positioned to recommend legal and policy measures to be 
adopted in the medium and long run to avert forced evictions.  Their opinions could serve as a 
basis for a dialogue with various stakeholders. Furthermore, using their promotional mandate 
NHRIs could sensitize the general public and government authorities of the need to attend to the 
right to adequate housing in general and the protection against forced evictions specifically. 
 
6. The Commission and Forced Evictions 
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While the Commission is said to have been fully operational in 2005, it started exercising its 
quasi-judicial function of investigating complaints in 2006. There has been a steady growth in the 
number of cases submitted to the Commission over the years following the Commission’s 
promotion campaigns to raise awareness about itself and human rights
55
. However, the total 
number of complaints submitted to the Commission since its inception, which exceeds a little 
over 6000, is rather small given the sheer size of the country and its poor human rights records
56
. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the exact number of complaints submitted to the 
Commission in general is difficult to come by. This is largely attributable to the poor file 
management and recording of cases prior to 2010, before the Commission reformed its business 
process. The reform, launched in 2009 and completed in 2010, culminated in changing its 
organizational structure. It resulted in, among others, rearranging the original departments and 
also created new sections and posts, one of which is the Registrar at the Investigation 
Directorate
57
. One can observe an improvement in the delivery of services in general and file 
management in particular after the Registrar went operational
58
. 
 
The recent statistics indicates a marked increase in the number of cases submitted to the 
Commission. More than 1427 complaints submitted to the Commission in 2012/2013 represent 
an even greater increase over the 65 cases received in its first year of operation
59
. 
 
Broadly catalogued, the types of cases submitted to the Commission since it commenced 
discharging its functions are pertaining to employment-related matters, interpersonal land 
disputes, property, security of person, freedom of movement, equality and non-discrimination, 
                                                 
55
 The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Inaugural Report, 2011, p. 91(hereinafter referred to as ‘Inaugural 
Report Inaugural Report’); see also the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 2009/2010, pp. 14-
15(hereinafter referred to as ‘Annual Report 2009/2010’). 
56
Ethiopia is a vast country with over 85 million people. The poor human rights record of the country is well-
documented by human rights NGOs, both local and international. Reports issued by, among others, the US State 
Department, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Ethiopian Human Rights Council attest to this 
fact. Based on its own documents, the Commission received a little over 6000 complaints since its inception. The 
rather low number of complaints has to do with the sheer size of the country accompanied by a lack of branch offices 
until recently or the inadequacy of promotion works by the Commission and/or a lack of awareness regarding the 
Commission’s function or lack of interest in the Commission as it lacks executive powers. Among others, a sustained 
promotion by the Commission about itself and the newly opened branches offices and the likely increase in the 
number of such offices in the near future will possibly increase the number of complaints coming to the Commission.  
57
 Owing to the lack of Registrar prior to April 2010 cases ended up in the hands of individual investigators as there 
was no practice of a centralized system of recording and admitting cases. See Inaugural Report, supra note 55, op. 
cit., pp. 55-56 
58
 See the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 2010/2011, p. 8(hereinafter referred to as ‘Annual 
Report 2010/2011’). 
59
 See the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 2012/2013(hereinafter referred to as ‘Annual Report 
2012/2013).  
condition of detention in prisons and police stations, inter-ethnic conflicts, election-related issues,  
and forced eviction from land and house
60
. 
 
In terms of their number, forced eviction-related complaints feature high among complaints that 
keep on appearing before the Commission annually. Broadly put, they relate to arbitrary eviction 
from house and/or land without prior notice and consultation, or without prior arrangement to 
relocate or provide them compensation. Most of the forced evictions were carried out for the 
purpose of making way to undertake infrastructure development (road construction and real 
estate) and for commercial farming. The complaints were mostly made against government 
authorities. In few cases, they were related to rental terms and conditions and complaints were 
lodged against private individuals or entities. For instance, a tenant who could not afford rent 
increment by the landlord was forced out of his house. He filed a complaint arguing that the 
action of the landlord leading to the loss of shelter constitutes violation of the right to housing. 
He was directed to the Ombudsman. 
 
The investigation of complaints on forced eviction is an exception rather than the norm. The 
Commission managed to investigate few complaints on forced eviction, referring the greater part 
of them to the Ombudsman and a few to courts of law. Those investigated relate to the ones in the 
context of civil strife involving communal or ethnic violence. 
 
6.1. Investigation of Individual and Group Complaints over Forced Evictions in 
Urban Areas 
 
The Commission has been receiving complaints involving the right to adequate housing and 
issues of forced eviction. One important case filed to the Commission that could have given rise 
to important human rights issues in general and government policy on housing matters in 
particular is worth mentioning. The case is over forced eviction from and final demolition of 
houses built without permit.  Sadly, the Commission rejected the case on the ground that it lacks 
jurisdiction over such matter. It is good to have some background on the case to shed light on 
how it could have given rise to human rights issues related to the right to housing in general and 
forced evictions in particular, and the obligation of the State in this regard.  
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Land is a scare resource in urban areas, especially around Addis Ababa owing to rapid 
urbanization. Problems of land-management and bureaucratic hurdles making the provision of 
land to ordinary citizens difficult, the souring cost of renting, the unbearable cost of the available 
land along with the failure of the successive governments to address the longstanding housing 
problems in urban areas have forced citizens to get a roof over their head by means of their 
choice
61
. It thus forced citizens to engage in the construction of houses without permit, known 
locally as ‘Chereka Bet’, which has become a recurrent problem in big cities, especially Addis 
Ababa. The Government has been cracking down on such activities, which gained momentum 
following its ambitious quest to make land available for, inter alia, industries, real estate, and for 
construction of government-financed houses. 
 
Mindful of the cause of construction without permit and housing problems in urban areas, the 
government has recently been trying to address the predicament through, among others, engaging 
in massive construction of houses, especially for low-income citizens, to alleviate their chronic 
shortages. Despite this, the problem still persists.  
 
Forced-eviction is aggravated following a policy change by the incumbent ruling party (EPRDF). 
Putting rural development as its core economic development policy, the Party did not have an 
urban development policy for more than a decade since it assumed power in 1991. The adoption 
of its Urban Policy in 2003 followed by sustained economic growth led to a face-lift of many big 
cities in the country, especially Addis Ababa. The expansion of different business activities lead 
to scramble for land acquisition, spurring massive increase of its price and exacerbating the 
pending availability problem. 
 
One of the means to alleviate chronic shortage of housing is the introduction of urban renewal, 
which calls for demolition of slums in different parts of Addis Ababa, affecting many poor 
communities living in them. Of course many of the poor communities were relocated to low-cost 
houses (called locally ‘Condominium’). The transfer has not only affected their livelihood but 
also their social bonds. It affected the petty commerce they used to engage in, subjected them to 
transportation difficulties and their long-established social schemes such as Idir and Iqub. The 
eviction thus puts not only the right to housing at stake but also the right to protection of 
property, livelihood, and social and cultural issues. 
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The case could have given the chance to the Commission to see the obligation of the state in 
relation to housing rights and forced evictions, and policy and administrative measures 
undertaken by it to address the problem. The FDRE constitution does not guarantee the right to 
housing per se in explicit terms. However, it is incumbent upon the government to allocate 
resources to give social services including education and health (Article 41(3). The social service 
referred to here could include housing as the provision is not meant to be exhaustive.  One of the 
‘National Policy Principles’ included in the constitution obliges the state to adopt policies and 
measures so long as resources permit, to provide social service to citizens, including housing 
(Article 90(1). Furthermore, as Ethiopia is a state party to the ICESCR, the Commission could 
have ample justifications to look at the case and its policy and administrative implications to the 
obligations of the state in this regard. At least, it would, as a face-saving measure, have been 
better for the Commission to refer the matter to the Ombudsman than to reject it since 
administrative decision was involved in carrying out the action. 
 
Admittedly, while forced eviction from land occupied and constructed carried out without permit 
is justifiable, subject to conditions, the Commission failed to examine whether the case at hand 
falls under such instances.  
 
In connection with forced eviction some complaints could also have provoked issues of adequate 
standard of living and the right to adequate housing. A complaint, filed by a group of 19 
complainants, was over houses given to them as replacement for their demolished ones. They 
alleged that the new houses do not have basic amenities, such as toilet and water, falling short in 
standard to the ones they used to live in. In another more or less similar complaint, applicants 
alleged that new houses given to them do not meet necessary standard, are smaller in size than 
they used to live in and far from shopping areas, forcing them to incur unexpected and unbearable 
expenses. The Commission preferred to provide advice in both cases instead of investigating the 
matter while these cases were essentially on the right to adequate standard of living and to 
adequate housing. 
 
6.2. Investigation of Communal or Ethnic Violence Causing Forced Evictions 
 
Many instances of forced evictions are associated with violence, such as evictions resulting from 
international armed conflicts, internal strife and communal or ethnic violence
62
. The Commission 
has investigated alleged human rights abuses arising from communal violence in different parts 
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of the country. Investigation of such issues is the hallmark of the Commission’s quasi-judicial 
function. The Commission is quick to dispatch its ad hoc Committee to deal with such matters 
and issue recommendations. This is probably because abuses arising from violent communal 
conflict may not directly implicate government authorities and its agents. The Commission has 
invested its energy in investigating private matters and non-state entities in areas such as labour 
and conflict rather than abuses attributable to government authorities and their agents
63
. 
 
To mention just one example, communal violence giving rise to multiple claims of human rights 
abuse, including forced evictions, occurred in the Southern part of the country. 
 
In an ethnic conflict that flared up in the southern part of the country, the Commission launched 
an investigation, following the submission to it of a complaint, to determine whether human 
rights violations had actually occurred and to recommend an appropriate legal and professional 
advice to resolve the problem
64
. The complaint submitted by a group of people purporting to act 
on behalf of the Guji ethnic group alleged that fellow members of their ethnic group were subject 
to a consistent torture, forced disappearance, death, detention, eviction from their house and land, 
and destruction of their livelihood since a referendum was held in the area to decide whether to 
put the area within the South Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State or Oromia 
National Regional State
65
.  They alleged that in the latest violent attacks against them by the 
Sidama ethnic group, some people were killed and others disappeared, many houses were set 
ablaze, some household animals were looted and killed, and farms were set on fire for the sole 
reason that they happen to be ethnic Guji living among the Sidamas. They added that the local 
administration dominated by the Sidamas was complicit in the attacks targeting them. 
 
The Commission did not however find that there was a deliberate and systemic policy to 
discriminate and attack the Guji community that was put in place by the local administration 
dominated by the Sidamas
66
. However, it found out that security forces failed to take adequate 
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measures before full-fledged violence erupted, which could have averted the crisis
67
. It finally 
recommended measures to be adopted to solve inter-ethnic conflicts in the area
68
.  
 
To bring down forced evictions in the area, the Commission, in its specific recommendation, said 
that a combination of administrative, political and traditional mechanisms had to be deployed to 
address the root cause of the conflict so that lasting peace may prevail in the area
69
. It also called 
upon the local administration to reinforce its endeavour to repair damaged house and/ or to 
rebuild houses burnt down
70
. 
 
The recommendation is remarkable in that it used strong words against the police and security 
forces, blaming them for not acting prudently to avert the crisis in the first place and also in 
calling for the usage of traditional means in conjunction with formal laws in dealing with the root 
cause of the problem. 
 
6.3. Monitoring and Investigating Complaints in the Context of Development 
Policy-Grand Failure of the Commission 
 
Before examining complaints indicating the fiasco of the Commission to face up to challenging 
government policies impinging on human rights, it is important to offer a hasty (brief) view of the 
recent economic and development policies in force. 
 
Despite making impressive economic growth in the last couple of years, Ethiopia remains one of 
the poorest nations in the world. Food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition are traits associated 
with Ethiopia and continue to plague the lives of a considerable portion of its population. 
Ensuring food security in order to tackle deaths stemming from hunger as well as 
malnourishment should inevitably be the key development and economic policies of the 
government. Safety-net program, promotion of small-scale irrigation scheme by local farmers and 
attracting foreign direct investment in commercial farming, and resettlement of population are 
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some of the major long-term development policies adopted by the incumbent government to 
ensure food security and food productivity. 
 
To reinforce its development endeavour aimed at, among others, economic growth in general and 
securing food security in particular, the government has given an ideological clout to it. The 
notion of ‘developmental state’ has thus gained a growing traction in the political discourse and 
vernacular of the ruling party, particularly since the debacle of the 2005 general election, which 
plunged the country in political turmoil
71
. To put the notion in concrete economic policy and 
plan, the government came up with the ‘Growth and Transformation Plan’ in 2011. No matter 
(Although) it mentions public participation, transparency and good governance, the Plan seems to 
favour a needs-based approach to development issues rather than a rights-based approach
72
. 
Because the term development is linked almost exclusively to economic targets (i.e., the growth 
of GDP), it glosses over critical issues such as human rights, democratic participation by civil 
society and groups, and the protection of local populations. 
 
Among the government development policies, foreign investment in agriculture and the 
resettlement program account for the bulk of the rapidly growing spate of forced evictions in 
rural areas. 
 
Regarding foreign investment, Ethiopia is often cited as one of the countries where ‘land-
grabbing’ is occurring. It has been handing out huge tracts of land to foreign investors drawn 
from different countries, including India, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti. The bulk of fertile land 
transferred to investors is situated in less populated low-land areas,, including Gambella and 
Benishangul Gumuz Regions where much of the remaining intact forest in the country is situated. 
In many instances, local communities were driven out of their ancestral land to give way to 
commercial farming allegedly without prior consultation with the affected communities and/or 
inadequate compensation. (Please add reference to substantiate this claim) 
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The recent resettlement program has focused on four regional states, namely Somali, Afar, 
Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella. At the heart of the program is the settlement of people in 
selected core areas so that better education, health, water and other facilities can be made 
available to a sizeable population. It entails the eviction of people from the area they inhabit and 
restricts them to newly formed villages. Admittedly, it is largely a voluntary and participatory 
exercise. However, some suggest that these conditions were undermined by requirements to fulfil 
quotas for the program
73
.  
 
Looked at from a human rights perspective, issues of participation, transparency, accountability 
and effective access to remedies are to be given attention in the implementation of any 
government development policy in general and during forced evictions in particular. 
Investigating and monitoring whether the transfer of land to foreign investors and resettlement 
programs are implemented in ways not trampling on human rights of citizens are within the ambit 
of the Commission. Unfortunately the Commission, as an independent institution, could not 
discharge its functions in this regard. It failed to examine individual complaints arising from 
development policies let alone launch inquiry by its own initiative to probe such important 
human rights issues. 
 
The Commission appears to be more comfortable with the protection of human rights where the 
issues involved do not have political overtones and are politically not sensitive
74
. Where issues 
involved in a complaint have political overtones, the Commission tends to avoid them by 
disclaiming competence to handle them
75
. Two cases marking the Commission’s inability to 
entertain politically sensitive matters confronting human rights deserve attention here. 
 
The Gambella Case 
 
The Commission rejected, for want of jurisdiction, an interesting complaint filed by a 
representative of people living in a protected forest that could have given rise to important human 
rights issues such as participation, transparency, and provision of effective remedies with specific 
human rights issues including the right to housing, the right to work and protection of the 
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environment
76
. The Complaint was instituted by Tamiru Ambello, acting on behalf of the 
community living in the area, to challenge the decision of the Gambella National Regional State, 
which decided to hand over the forest area to an investor for the purpose of tea farming
77
. The 
complainants alleged that they were not consulted before the decision was made and that the 
clearing of the forest to give way to tea farming would have a devastating impact on the 
environment as well as on their livelihood based on the forest. Their attempt to get remedy of 
injunction from the local administration and regional government institutions was in vain.  
 
Upon learning that the investor had already cleared a sizeable chunk of the forest, the 
complainants submitted a written request to the President of the country to intervene in the matter 
and help them halt the clearing of the forest. Sympathetic with their case, the President asked the 
Commission to intervene and investigate their complaint. They submitted their complaint to the 
Commission along with the letter of the President and other supporting documents. The 
investigation team at the Commission accepted the case but needed, before launching 
investigation, a professional advice on environmental issues at stake in the case and put their 
request informally to some experts and local organizations working on environmental issues such 
as Pact Ethiopia and Forum for Environment. The experts and the organizations asked the 
investigators to make a formal request, i.e. to produce a written letter of the Commission. The 
leadership of the Commission refused to issue a formal letter on the ground that the case does not 
fall within the purview of the Commission and ordered a referral of the case to the Ombudsman 
Institute, which in its turn remanded the case back to the Commission. In the end, both 
institutions failed to deal with the case. 
 
There is no provision that precludes the Commission, or Ombudsman, from investigating such 
complaint as it is not considered by courts and other institutions
78. The Commission’s action 
contravenes its obligations under the enabling statute to investigate any complaint related to 
human rights violations so long as the matter is not pending before other organs. Perhaps, the 
leadership of the Commission, as well as that of the Ombudsman, felt that the issues involved in 
the case pit them against the policy of the government to transfer large chunks of land to 
investors on the one hand and allegations of so called ‘land-grabbing’ for which the Ethiopian 
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government has been criticized by experts and international organizations on the other
79
. The 
government appears to be very sensitive on matters of allocation of massive swathes of land to 
foreign investors. It has always been denying allegations that ‘land-grabbing’ has taken place and 
argues that its action is part of its long-term bid for economic development ,  to attract foreign 
investment and technology transfer, to spur employment opportunity, and to help eradicate 
hunger and thereby ensure food self-sufficiency
80
. The Commission seems to realize the 
sensitivities involved in the case and decided not to confront the government by investigating the 
matter, constituting a self-imposed restraint.  
 
The Gura Farda Case 
 
The Commission was tight-lipped over the recent forced eviction of thousands of people from the 
Gurafarda (area?), situated in Southern part of the country. The South Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples’ Regional State decided to evict thousands of people who were accused of illegally 
occupying land without permit, causing deforestation and damaging the ecosystem. As a result, 
many of the victims claimed to have been evicted without advance notice and time to even collect 
their personal belongings let alone agricultural produce. Some of them even alleged to have been 
forcibly loaded onto trucks and buses and dropped in Addis Ababa, from where they were finally 
sent to their place of origin, situated in some part of the Amhara National Regional State. The 
action of the government caused fury among human rights NGOs, both local and international, 
and the opposition parties operating both locally and abroad, becoming a headline issue for some 
time
81
. Some people go so far as saying the action was part of a systemic attack singling out the 
Amhara people
82
. 
 
During a Parliamentary session, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi angrily denied the 
accusation that it was a systemic action targeting the Amharas. He argued that it was a simple act 
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to deter people from flocking to the area illegally and pointed out that settlement from one State 
to another had to be coordinated between the two States involved
83
. Bolstering the argument of 
the Federal government, the local administration pointed out that those evicted were the ones who 
settled in the area illegally after 2005 and the ones who arrived before that period had already 
been given permission to settle
84
. 
 
Some of the victims of the eviction lodged a group complaint to the Commission, alleging that 
the eviction was arbitrary, that they were subjected to violence and lost their entire fortune. 
Apparently fearing the sensitivities involved in the matter, the Commission refrained from taking 
any action on the case. By the same token, the Commission also failed to act on individual 
complaints from some of the victims in the case at hand. It opted to refer the matter to the 
Ombudsman, disclaiming jurisdiction over the case. 
 
The rejection of Gambella and Gurafarda cases begs the question of whose interest the 
Commission is serving.  Actually, it negates the very underpinning for the establishment of the 
institution. 
 
Respect for and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of the FDRE constitution. The 
Commission is one of the institutional means to realize this. The basic rationale for its 
establishment is to achieve a permanent shift from the autocratic polities of the past to a just and 
democratic political arrangement in which the supremacy of law and good governance 
flourishes
85
. The institution is thus meant to serve as the frontline mainstay for ensuring that the 
new status quo does not slide back to the human rights abuses of the past by seeing to it that the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens remain the constant centre of all 
developmental endeavours being made
86
. Quite contrary to its inherent objective, the failure of 
the Commission to investigate the case means that it failed to test whether the development 
policy of the government is in line with the human rights ethos espoused by the Constitution. 
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settlement or villagization will disturb the ethnic makeup of Regions, consistent with the foundation of the current 
federal arrangement based largely on ethno-linguistic factors. He (the Prime Minister) reiterated the same during a 
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Whenever the Commission dares to investigate politically sensitive matters, it relies on a behind-
the-scene approach rather than on its formal powers in the form of naming and shaming. 
Actually, a clandestine mode of engagement with government authorities is the hallmark of the 
Commission’s enforcement mechanism87. Using informal means of communication, the 
Commission has been able to secure remedies for claimants in some instances. For instance, 
concerning forced eviction, the Commission’s intervention helped to secure remedy to people 
who were forcibly removed from their houses
88. In another case, the Commission’s intervention 
helped victims to resettle in the land from where they were removed to give way to a hydropower 
and irrigation project in the Tana Beles area
89
.  
Actually, such informal engagement is inevitable in an authoritarian tradition. Formal 
enforcement mechanisms in the form of naming and shaming does not ….?, as argued by 
commentators, in authoritarian countries with a controlled media and a frail judiciary
90
.  In such 
system, informal communication produces far better results than usage of formal enforcement 
powers granted to NHRIs
91
. While informal means help offer remedy in individual cases and 
keep the channel of communication with the government open, it undermines inherent powers 
and thereby put the Commission’s credibility at risk. 
 
6.4. Lack of Systemic Inquiry 
 
The power to initiate suo moto and/or systemic investigation can help NHRIs meet the needs of 
individuals or communities who may not otherwise be heard
92
. This is because disadvantaged and 
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88
 The Commission has relied on informal method of conveying information to government officials through means 
such as informal contact persons instead of written letter or publication of information through the media or other 
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vulnerable sections of society are not likely in a position to access judicial and quasi judicial 
bodies. It gives such groups a public voice, making human rights violations to become a matter of 
general knowledge and concern, which is a requisite step towards dealing with them
93
.  
 
The Commission is not active in the area of conducting both suo moto investigation and systemic 
inquiry into legal, policy, administrative and institutional issues that give rise to recurring human 
rights problems in the country. The failure to do so is attributed predominantly to the 
Commission’s inability to confront government policies and to lack of capacity to some degree. 
Be that as it may, the Commission conducted limited suo moto investigation, most of which relate 
to the alleged killings of individuals in conflict situations and/or in an isolated incident, and 
orphanage facilities in different parties of the country
94
.  
Potentially reversing its lack of pro-activism the Commission plans to conduct inquiry into some 
issues, including issues of large-scale land transfer to investors as well as religious conflicts
95
. It 
appears that a torrent of criticism against the government decision to allocate a whopping portion 
of land to investors has spurred the Commission to plan this. In addition, the Commission intends 
to do so apparently to off-set its failure to investigate such matters in a group complaint 
submitted to it in 2011, for which it was fiercely denigrated. Such proposed suo moto 
investigation is akin to public inquiry, although the details of how to go about conducting it are 
not yet available. Be that as it may if the outcome of the study is going to be presented for public 
discussion, it could reshape public view regarding such matter, which in the long-run might shape 
policy on it. 
 
(The Commission has not dared to sensitize issues of the right to adequate standard of living in 
general and of forced eviction to the specific) unclear statement, please rephrase despite the 
practice of forced eviction has become a widespread and recurrent problem, both in urban and 
rural areas. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
                                                                                                                                                              
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and 
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 Some relate to the investigation of violent conflict between religious groups, and inter-ethnic clashes between 
Sidama and Oromo in around Wondogenet, and riots in some part of the Country. See Annual Report  2010/2011 
supra note 69, op. cit., p. 71. On inquiry into orphanage facilities see Annual Report 20011/2012, supra note, 60, op. 
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The NHRIs are institutions whose role is to realign State behaviour by constantly criticizing the 
government’s wrongful acts that trample on human rights, offering inside perspective to it. By the 
very nature of their mandate, it is inevitable for NHRIs to be on collusion course with the 
government. If there is no more friction between the institutions and their respective 
governments, such institution is not part of NHRI anymore
96
. It is thus vital for the legitimacy of 
particular NHRI not to yield to pressure, direct or indirectly, from a government agency in 
carrying out its role even if it pits it against the government
97
. Indeed, tackling controversial 
issues even if it brings the institution on collision course with the government or its agencies is 
the public legitimacy litmus test for a NHRI
98
.  
Avoiding confrontation with the government, the Commission refused to act on complaints 
alleging important questions of human rights violations, notably on politically sensitive issues, by 
disclaiming jurisdiction. Its failure to handle such matters has seriously undermined its standing, 
giving rise to perception of lack of independence. 
The failure of the Commission to hold the government to account is rooted partly in the 
authoritarian political tradition that tightly controls all government institutions and the rampant 
culture of impunity. When authoritarianism is deeply-embedded, the accountability mechanisms 
such as tribunals and NHRIs have a limited role in constraining government powers.  
Be that as it may, the Commission, as an independent institution, was set up for the purpose of 
protecting human rights. The real test of its independence lies in its ability to challenge the 
government by investigating human rights violations appearing before it. The Commission 
should not thus shy away from probing politically sensitive matters. 
NHRIs need to have clear legal criteria and procedures in place when operating with a 
controversial case, especially in a delicate political and legal environment
99
. In its operational 
procedure, the Commission needs to enunciate clear procedure on considering sensitive and high 
profile cases in order to avoid selectivity in launching investigation on matters. No matter crucial 
policies are involved in government development ventures, the obligation to protect implies an 
active role on the part of the state and its institutions to ensure that policies and actions taken to 
effect government programs are carried out in conformity with human rights norms and relevant 
principles.  
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As Ethiopia is still at an early stage in the transition towards democracy, there is a need for 
democratic institutions to hold the government accountable. This is significant given the fact that 
human rights abuses, particularly forced evictions, are a recurring problem in the country. It is 
thus incumbent upon the Commission to challenge the government when instances for doing so 
materialize. Also, the Commission ought to regularly conduct human rights training for relevant 
authorities involved in or concerned with forced evictions. Such endeavour could help prevent 
human rights violations within the context of forced evictions. Additionally, the Commission has 
to conduct systemic investigation on the practice and publicize its findings so as to trigger debate 
on the subject-matter. 
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